Yes, provided the couple's 60 percent is held by Canadian nationals and they genuinely develop and direct the business. The risk lies not in his percentage but in any agreement that leaves him running the enterprise while they are passive owners.
Majority ownership is necessary, control is what is examined
The treaty-ownership requirement is satisfied where at least half of the business is owned by nationals of the treaty country, so a 60/40 split favouring the Lake Country couple passes. The consular officer then asks whether the investor will develop and direct the enterprise. Ownership of a controlling interest usually answers that, but the officer reads the operating agreement and the management contract.
Hypothetical example: the nephew's proposed agreement gives him sole authority over rates, staffing and vendor contracts for five years and makes him removable only for cause; on those terms the couple own the inn but do not direct it, and the case is exposed. Redraft so that the couple hold the decisive authority and the nephew's role is delegated and revocable. The couple's own intended duties should be described: one on operations and guest experience, one on finance and marketing, both resident at or near the property.
Their lodge background is useful evidence of capacity. A first review should produce a control chart, a signed operating agreement, and a payment trail that can be read without relying on oral promises. The chart identifies every owner and voting right; the agreement identifies which decisions the investors can make or delegate; bank and escrow records show that the capital is already committed and subject to loss.
The business plan must also show a realistic path beyond merely supporting the investors. Hypothetical example: a Lake Country specialty-coffee roaster proposes to buy a 65 percent interest in a Washington roasting company while the American founder keeps hiring authority and an unremovable management contract. The ownership percentage looks sufficient, but the documents show that the investor cannot direct the enterprise.
The parties must decide whether to revise the delegated role and governance terms before funds are committed, or abandon an E-2 structure that leaves the Canadian investor passive.